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I. Introduction

Environmental

Audits:
Barriers, Opportunities
and a Recommendation
By Keith M. Casto
Tiffany Billingsley Potter

Regulated entities conduct "environmental audits"' to comprehensively evaluate their facilities,
operations and procedures in order to achieve compliance with applicable environmental regulatory
requirements Moreover, companies of all types and
sizes increasingly emphasize international environmental standards- Certification to international environmental standards can help certifying companies
avoid trade barriers and achieve environmental compliance The present focus for most industries is on the
ISO 14000 series of international environmental management standards, referred to as "ISO 14000_"2
Although environmental audits may take many
forms, the two most common are compliance audits
and management audits. A compliance audit is an
investigation by internal or external environmental
specialists of a facility's compliance with applicable
environmental laws and regulations and the identification of non-regulatory environmental liability risks
A management audit consists of reviewing the
managerial risk control systems and procedures used
by the corporation or facility to detect and remedy possible violations and potentially problematic environmental conditions 3Often, a company voluntarily con5 Keith Ni Casto, Esq is a partner of Rosenblum, Parish &
Isaacs. PC in San lose California His practice focuses on environmental law. construction defect, real estate and related intellectual
propery litigation, and corporation finance Mr Casto was associated with the United States Environmental Protection Agency from
1975 to Iq85 Mr Casto isa member of the California State Bar, the
Georgia State Bar and the Florida State Bar
Tiffany Billingsley Potter, Esq isa law clerk in the San lose
office of Rosenblum, Parish & Isaacs Her practice focuses on environmental law Ms Potter received her I D from the University of
Georgia in 1997 She is a member of the Georgia State Bar and her
California State Bar membership is pending
I The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPAj
defines -environmental audits as -systematic, documented, penodic, and objective reviews by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements - EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed
Reg 25.004 (19861
2 ISO 14000 is a series of environmental management standards that consist of voluntary standards and guideline reference
documents addressing environmental management systems, enaronmental audits. eco-labeling, environmental performance evaluations, life cycle assessment and environmental standards for
products
3 Se generally Michael Ray Hams, Promoting Corporate SelfComplance An Examination of the Debate over Legal Protection for
Environmental Audits, 23
, L0 663 11996)
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ducts a management audit to review environmental compliance and risk control measures.
Management auditing is often an integral part
of an entity's overall environmental management system (EMS). An EMS that includes voluntary management auditing, such as that contemplated by the ISO 14000 standards, 4 can be
an effective means for a regulated entity to
achieve long-term compliance through preven5
tative environmental management.
Such preventative environmental management can be vitally important because, under
the current "command and control" environmental regulatory scheme, violations of applicable regulatory requirements can result in
severe legal sanctions such as penalties, fines,
injunctions, government contract debarment
for corporate offenders, and even incarceration
and fines for individual corporate officers,
directors, shareholders and employees. This
increasing stringency, complexity and volume
of regulatory requirements and enhanced
penalties for criminalization of violations compel careful self-analysis by regulated entities in
order to avoid liability for non-compliance.
Yet, at the same time, there is currently a
strong disincentive to undertake environmental auditing because of the potential discoverability by government agencies and third par-

ties of incriminating information and documents generated as a result of environmental
audits, and the potential use of the information and documents in civil or criminal
enforcement actions and civil toxic tort or cost
recovery litigation. Information generated by
environmental audits may become self-incriminating evidence in a later governmental regulatory enforcement action addressing problems such as regulatory violations, releases of
hazardous substances, failures to comply with
permits, or historical contamination, even If
the discovered violations are ultimately recti6
fied prior to enforcement.
Environmental audits undertaken for
the
purpose of uncovering and correcting environmental, health and safety problems actually
may increase the risk of civil litigation or criminal prosecutions. 7 Audit results may prove
constructive (or actual) prior knowledge of
non-compliance, heightening the risk and
magnitude of criminal liability under some
environmental statutes.8 These potential disincentives for environmental auditing make the
issues of environmental "audit privilege," or
potential immunity resulting from the environmental audit process, timely and important. In
fact, such protections relative to environmental audit results are one of the most hotly

4, The ISO standards have become an affirmative
marketing benchmark for suppliers and manufacturers;

Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U S C,§
9601 et seq. [hereinafter CERCLAI CERCLA Imposes on
all purchasers of real property the choice to investigate
potential hazardous contamination, or risk the attendant liability. While CERCLA's liability scheme Is harsh,
the statute provides an affirmative defense for "Innocent" purchasers of real property who have engaged In
"all appropriate inquiry" into the condition of the property and have no reason to know of the contamination.
The due diligence standard by which the "Innocence" of
a purchaser is measured is based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, the environmental site
assessment is part and parcel of every Industrial and
commercial real estate transaction
6. See, e.g., United States v. Dexter Corp 132 FR D.
8 (D.Conn. 1990); United States v,Chevron US A. Inc,
1989 WL 121616 (ED. Pa. 1989),

eventually the ISO 14000 environmental standards may
become an absolute condition precedent to participation in the global market. Moreover, voluntary compliance and performance audits may be required for certification under ISO 14000. Fora discussion of ISO 14000,
see Christopher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of
InternationalEnvironmental Management Systems Standards in
the United States. 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10678 (1995).
5.

In addition, environmental site assessments, a

distinct form of environmental audits, represent an
environmental evaluation focused on the presence of

soil or groundwater contamination (rather than compliance

with

ongoing

regulatory

requirements).

Environmental site assessments usually occur in connection with a transaction, such as the acquisition of
property or the refinancing of a loan on real property,
rather than as an ongoing process of self-evaluation.
The primary driving force for the environmental assessment is the harsh liability scheme of strict, joint and

several liability for owners of contaminated property
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental

7. See, Attorneys Debate Benefits of Confidentiality of
Environmental Audits, Daily Rep. for Exe:utives (BNA),

No.225 at A-10 (Nov,1991).

8. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1311.
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debated issues arising from ISO 1400, °
Recently, environmental policy has begun
to recognize the distinct benefits of encouraging voluntary environmental audits. This
recognition has forced policy makers to
address the tension between performance of
audits and the legal/regulatory disincentives
involved in disclosure of audit results.10 A
number of states have also recognized the
importance of encouraging environmental
auditing by passing legislation that provides
either some level of privilege for audit results,
immunity for the audited entity, or both.
Although similar federal legislation has been
proposed, it has so far failed to be enacted
into law.
These so-called "audit privilege statutes"
recognize the shortcomings of traditional privileges of attorney-client, attorney work product
and "critical self-analysis" in protecting the
results of environmental audits. The statutes
attempt to encourage environmental auditing
through a combination of audit privilege and,
in some cases, limited immunities.
The question arises whether an audit privilege against disclosure is the appropriate
remedy to facilitate auditing, since dissemination of audit results is an inherent function of
all types of environmental audits and EMSs, At
the same time, real incentives must be provided for regulated entities who undertake voluntary environmental auditing as part of an EMS,
and act upon the results of those audits to
achieve and maintain compliance.

II. Federal Environmental Policies
Regarding Environmental Audits

9. Under ISO 14011. the purpose of the environmental audit is to evaluate the effectiveness of the company's environmental management system Such selfevaluation can generate particularly sensitive information
relating to compliance with applicable regulatory requirements or evidence of misconduct or fault for purposes of
private party litigation.
10. See. e.g., Memo from EPA Deputy Administrator
Fred Hansen on EMS, 63 Fed. Reg. 12094 (19981.
II. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51
Fed. Reg. 25004 (1986).
12. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and SelfDisclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg 16875
(1995).
13. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclo-

sure. Correction and Prevention of Viofati ns, 60 Fed
Reg 66701 f19851 Ihereinafter Incentivesi For a discussion of the policy, see lames T Banks, EPA. New
Enforcement Pylicy At 1a31 a ReliabKe Roadmap to Civd Penalty
Mitigalion tor Sell-Dsc;doed Violatons 26 E,,. i. L RED 10227
( iqbgo For examples of organizations taking advantage of
the EPA polict see EPAAudit Policy Updates (visited Apr 13,
1991 <http1/ies epa go'/oeca audtpoi html>

A. EPA Audit Policy
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA or Agency) made its first official pronouncement on environmental auditing on
July 8.1986-11 This policy was clarified in July,
1994 and, again, in April, 1995 12 On December
22, 1995. EPA issued its final audit policy
statement which became effective January 22,
1996.13 The policy's stated goal is the "protection of human health and the environment by
encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily
discover, disclose, correct and prevent violations of federal environmental require-

ments " 4
The policy attempts to achieve this goal by
providing incentives in the form of a waiver of
"gravity-based" penalties for violations of federal environmental requirements where the
violations are discovered and disclosed
through an environmental audit or an EMS."
Under the policy, gravity-based penalties will
be reduced 75 percent for voluntary discovery
and prompt disclosure of violations, even if
the violation is not discovered through an
audit or a "compliance management system."' 6
In order to qualify for the EPA incentives
for self-policing (e g . a reduction in penalties),
the regulated entity must establish that it satisfies the following nine conditions spelled out
in section D of the policy

14

Incentives. supra note 13, at 66710
15 EPAs current policy defines -environmentaI
audit, as in the 1986 policy, as -a sistematic, documented. periodic and objective re.iew of regulated entities of
facility operattons and practices related to meeting environmental requirements- Id, see alo 51 Fed Reg, at
25006
16

Incentives supra note 13, at 66707
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I. the violation must be discovered
through "systematic discovery," namely (a)
an environmental audit; or (b) an objective,
documented, systematic procedure or practice reflecting the regulated entity's "due diligence" 17 in preventing, detecting and cor18
recting violations;
2. the discovery must not be legally mandated (e.g., it must not be an emissions violation detected through a continuous emission monitor, or a detected violation of the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES)); 19
3. the disclosure must be prompt (i.e.,
20
within ten days, in writing);
4. the discovery and disclosure must be
independent of government or third party
2
plaintiffs; '
5. correction of the violation must be made
within sixty (60) days, or else the regulated
entity must file notification that more than
22
sixty (60) days are needed for corrections;
6. there must be an agreement in writing to
take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, which may include improvements in
environmental auditing or due diligence
23
efforts;
7. there must be no "repeat violations"
(i.e., the specific violation must not have
occurred previously within' the past three
years at the same facility, or be a part of a
pattern of federal, state, or local violations
by the facility's parent organization which
24
has occurred within the past five years);
8. the violation must not be one which (a)
resulted in serious actual harm or may have
presented an imminent and substantial
17. The EPA policy defines "due diligence" as the
regulated entity's systematic efforts to prevent, detect and
correct violations through (a) compliance policies, standards and procedures, (b) assignment of overall responsibility, (c) mechanism for systematically assuring that
compliance policies are carried out, (d) efforts to commynicate effectively, (e) appropriate incentives to managers
and employees, and (f)procedures for prompt and appropriate correction. See id. at 66710-Il.
18. See id.at 66708.
19. See id.
20. See id.
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endangerment to human health or the environment; or (b) violated the specific terms of
any judicial or administrative order or consent agreement; 25 and
9. the regulated entity must cooperate
with EPA by providing such necessary information and requested by EPA in investigating the violation, including any noncompliance problems related to the disclosure and
any environmental consequences related to
26
the violations.
Under the policy, EPA retains lull discretion
to recover any economic benefit gained as a
result of noncompliance in order to preserve a
"level playing field" in which violators do not
gain a competitive advantage over other compliant regulated entities.27 Notably, the policy provides that EPA may forgive the entire penalty for
violations from entities which meet all of the
above nine conditions of section 1), and which,
in the Agency's opinion, do not merit penalties
due to the insignificant amount of economic
28
benefit gained.
In section C of the policy, EPA reiterates its
practice of not recommending criminal prosecution of a regulated entity when knowledge of the
violation is based on voluntary disclosure or
when violations are discovered through audits
and disclosed to the government before an
investigation is already underway." This practice, however, is limited to "good actors," and
does not apply, for example, to individuals where
corporate officials are consciously involved in, or
willfully blind to, violations or conceal or condone non-compliance.3 0 Further, the regulated
entity must satisfy all nine condi:ions of secSee id.at 66709.
See id.
See id.
See i.
See id.
See i. at 66709,
See i,. at 66707.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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tion D of the policy in order to avoid being recommended for criminal prosecution. 3' Therefore, when a company has met the conditions
for avoiding a recommendation for criminal
prosecution under the policy, the company
also will not face any civil liability for gravitybased penalties because the same conditions
for discovery, disclosure and correction apply
in both cases.
The EPA final policy restates its oft-repeated policy that it will not request or use an environmental audit report to initiate a civil or

enforcement) in states with audit privilege
7
laws.3
If a violation is discovered through a "systematic procedure or practice" that is not an
audit te g, an EMS). the regulated entity will
be asked to document how its program reflects
the criteria for due diligence as defined in section B of the policy " EPA may require that a
description of the regulated entity's due diligence efforts be made publicly available as a
condition of penalty mitigation-3r'

criminal investigation of the entity3 2 EPA

B. EPA's Criminal Enforcement Policy
On October I, 1997, EPA's Office of
Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training
(OCEFT) published a memorandum discussing
the principles guiding EPA's exercise of investigative discretion with respect to voluntarily
disclosed potential criminal violations_4 - The
memorandum issued by the Director of OCEFT
has three stated purposes I I it is designed to
parallel the nine conditions outlined in the
Self-Policing Policy, (2) it explains how those
conditions apply to criminal cases, and $3) it
provides guidance for consistent consideration

retains the ability, however to seek the factual
information which might go into such an audit
33
report.
Importantly, too, in section F, EPA restates
its firm opposition to statutory environmental
audit privileges that, in EPA's opinion, "shield
evidence of environmental violations and
undermine the public's right to know."3 4 EPA
also restates its opposition to "blanket immunities" for violations that reflect criminal conduct presenting serious threats or actual harm
to health and the environment, and/or for violations which allow non-complying companies
to gain economic advantage. 35 EPA indicates
that it will work with states to address provisions of state audit privilege or immunity laws
that are inconsistent with the EPA policy. EPA
expressly reserves the right, however, to take
necessary actions to protect public health by

4
of requests for relief under the Policy '

policy, EPA "backed off" from its 1995 interim
policy statement that it would scrutinize
enforcement more closely (and increase

Pursuant to the OCEFT policy, if a party
requests relief for disclosure relating to potential criminal violations, that request is consid42
ered by OCEFT's Voluntary Disclosure Board
After considering the request and applying the
OCEFT policy, the Board makes a recommendation to a Deciding Official for the violation '3
The Deciding Official then makes a final recommendation to the appropriate United States
Attorney's Office 44

31. See id.
32. See id.at 66708.
33. See id.; see also Memo from Steve Herman.
Assistant Administrator. Confidentiality of Information Received
Under the Agency's Self-Disclosure Policy (visited Apr. 13, 1999)
<httpi/les.epa.gov/oeca/sahmemohtml>.
34. Incentives, supra note 13, at 66712; see also, EPA
Memorandum, EPA Statement on State Enforcement.
Impact of Audit/Immunity Privilege Law. February 14, 1997
(on file with authorsi. For a general discussion of EPAs
opposition to privilege laws and a criticism of EPA's opposition, see Lisa Koven. The Environmental Self-Audit

36 See d
37 Compare Incentives, supra note 13, at 66712 uith
Interim Policy, supra note 13, at 16878
38 See Incentives. supra note 13, at 66711
39 See d
40 Implementatton of tie EPAs Self-Policing
Policy for Disclosures Involving Potential Criminal
Violations Memo from OCEFT Director Earl E Devanej,
28 EsrL L REn 35692 11997)1 hereinafter OCEFT MemoI
41 See d
42 See d

enforcing violations of federal law.36 In the final

Evidentiary Privilege, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1167 (1998),

35. See Incentives, supra note 13. at 66712.

43

See id

44
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The OCEFT memo discusses each of the
nine conditions contained in the EPA SelfPolicing Policy and provides for the specific
application of each condition in criminal
cases, 45 The OCEFT policy is substantially similar to the EPA Self-Policing Policy. Notably,
however, the OCEFT policy provides for consideration of "any good faith disclosure" made
before a criminal investigation is started, not
just those reported pursuant to an "environmental audit" or a "due diligence" program. 46 In
addition, the OCEFT policy clarifies that, if an
entity claims a privilege applies to protect
information contained in an audit or due diligence program, the privilege must be asserted
47
in good faith.
C. Draft Sentencing Guidelines
In November, 1993, the United States
Sentencing Commission promulgated its
"Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines for
Environmental Violations." 48 When finalized,
these guidelines will be used by the federal
judiciary in imposing sentences on convicted
defendants by the United States Attorneys in
fashioning plea bargains. In order to avoid
aggravation of the "base offense level," an
organization must document the existence of
some form of program or other organized effort
49
to achieve and maintain compliance.
Conversely, to establish a basis for aggravation
of the base offense level, the prosecution has
the burden of demonstrating that "the organization substantially failed to implement a program or other organized effort to achieve and
maintain compliance."'50 The proposed guidelines move beyond the policy statements of
EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
45.

See id.

46,

See id.

47, See id.
48, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Env't Rep.
(BNA) at 1382-83 (November 26, 1993) [hereinafter
Sentencing Guidelinesl. For a general discussion of these
guidelines, see Woodrow, The Proposed Federal Environmental
Sentencing Guidelines. A Model for Corporate Environmental
Compliance Programs, Env't Rep. (BNA) at 325 (June 17,
1994) and Baram, The New Environmentfor ProtectingCorporate
Information, Env't Rep. (BNA) at 545 (July 22, 1994).
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describe in detail the specific components of a
"minimum" corporate environmental compli5
ance program. '
One of the mitigating factors under the
guidelines is a "commitment to environmental
compliance," which includes the following elements:
"1. Management attention to compliance;
2. Integration of environmental policies,
standards and procedures;
3. Auditing, monitoring, reporting ,and
tracking system;
4. Regulatory expertise, training and evaluation;
5. Incentive to compliance;
6. Disciplinary procedures;
7. Continuing education and improvement;
52
8. Additional innovative approaches."
More specifically, with respect to auditing
systems, the organization must design and
implement systems and programs designed to
ensure that: (1) facilities comply with applicable environmental regulations; (2) facilities or
specific operations that present a significant
risk to the environment are continuously monitored on-site; (3) an internal reporting system
is instituted which allows employees to notify
appropriate personnel of potential non-compliance; (4) a system is instituted which tracks
responses to identified compliance, issues; and
(5) there are continual independent evaluations of compliance in operations with a'history of non-compliance,'or where the organization reasonably believes a potential problem
exists. 53
49. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 48, at §
9CI.2(a).
50. Id. at §9Cli.(f).

51. Compare Sentencing Guidelines, at § 9D1.i with
Incentives, supra note 13, at 66710 (defining of "environmental audit" and "due diligence")

52. Sentencing Guidelines supra note 48, at § QDL 1.
53. See id,; see also Definition of Corporate Compliance
Called Major Strength of Draft Guidelines, Env't Rep. (BNA) at
1356 (November 26, 1993)

1Autit Brcfvnmes
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Under Part F of the Sentencing Guidelines,
a court may require, as a condition of probation, that a convicted organization develop an
auditing program, acceptable to the court and
reviewable by the government, "to detect and
prevent future violations." 4 If the organization
fails to submit an acceptable program, the
court may hire experts at the defendant's
expense to develop such a program." Such
experts must be allowed by the organization to
have access to whatever information is neces56
sary to create such a program.
Upon approval of the auditing program by
the court, the defendant organization must
notify its employees and shareholders, as well
as the public, of its "criminal behavior" and the
terms of the auditing program.' 7 The defendant
must also make periodic reports to the court
regarding its progress in implementing the
approved auditing program, including any subsequent civil or criminal enforcement actions
8
or investigations.'
In order to tnonitor the defendant's compliance with the auditing program, the defendant may be required to submit to third party
examination of its books and records, inspection of its facilities, testing and monitoring of
its operations, and regular or unannounced
interviews of its employees as the court deems
necessary 9 The costs of such monitoring
activities must be borne by the defendant organization. 60 Reports by the outside experts on
such monitoring activities must be filed with
the court and furnished to the public, 61 Finally,
a defendiant may be required to submit to a
financial audit of its books, including how it
62
disburses its funds.
54.

Sentencing Guidelines. supra note 48, at §

9F1.3(d).

55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58.

See id.

59.

See id.

60.

See id.

61.

See id.

62.

Id.; see also Keith M. Casto. International Environ-

D. Department of Justice Policy
In July 1991, DOJ released a criminal
enforcement policy entitled "Factors in
Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of
Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure
Efforts by the Violator"6 The purpose of the
policy is to ensure that criminal prosecutions
do not "undermine the goal of encouraging
critical self-auditing, self-policing and voluntary disclosure ,t" The policy considers favorably corporate offenders that implement compliance programs and adhere to practices of
critical self-auditing and voluntary disclosure .s
The policy sets out three broad mitigating
factors to guide United States Attorneys in
their exercise of discretion I II voluntary disclosure of environmental violations, 12) cooperation with the government's investigation,
and (3) implementation of preventative measures and compliance programs ; 1 The policy
also lists additional relevant factors, including
the pervasiveness of non-compliance, the existence of effective internal disciplinary action,
and the subsequent implementation of compliance and remedial efforts 6
Finally DOJ policy does not specify the
minimum components of a compliance program, but gives examples of the components of
successful compliance programs as follows (I j
institutional policy to comply with environmental law, 121 regular internal and external
audits of compliance (3j procedures to safeguard integrity of audits, 14j multimedia evaluation of compliance, (5i timely implementation of auditor's recommendations, 16) dedication of adequate company resources, (71 effecmntl
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tive system of disciplining employees; and (8)
a corporate policy of rewarding employees'
contribution to environmental compliance.6 8
III. President Clinton's Reinvention of
Government
The Clinton Administration has initiated a
number of proposals designed to implement a
new environmental management system which
represents an alternative to the traditional
"command and control" and "end-of-pipe"
approaches that, since 1970, have dominated
environmental regulation and enforcement. The
Administration recognized that while traditional
approaches have yielded results, these results
have been obtained at the cost of creating a
massive regulatory system that, at times, was
unreasonably prescriptive, inflexible and expensive.
On March 16, 1995, the Clinton Adminis-tration introduced a series of proposals aimed at
"reinventing environmental regulation" so as to
align economic incentive, environmental goals
and technological innovation, in such a way as
to have economic growth improve, rather than
diminish, environmental quality.69 These proposals are based on "clear and measurable
national goals" and implementing performance
standards, with sufficient accompanying flexibility, that industry can determine the means for
achieving those goals and standards. 70 EPA
intends to achieve this flexibility through
indemnity and site specific variability rather
than through a "one size fits all" approach. 7' The
environmental proposals set forth twenty-five
high priority actions for reinventing regulation
and fourteen other significant actions to rein68.

See id.

69. See generally, Reinventing Environmental ProtectionEPA's Approach (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/

reinvent/strategy>.
70.

See id.

71.

See id.

72. For information on Project XL, see Project XL
(visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://yosemite.epa.gov/xi/
xl-home.nsf/all/homepage>.
73. Project XL is currently limited to fifty pilot projects. As of April 1998, seven pilot programs had been

vent environmental regulation. Three of the
most significant proposals, in term3 of environmental auditing, are discussed below,
A. Project XL
The most notable Clinton Administration
program, designed to provide alternative performance-based strategies for meeting envi7
ronmental requirements, is "Project XL." 2
Project XL is designed to provide a limited
number of companies 73 the opportunity to
demonstrate environmental excellence and
leadership by creating agreements between
EPA and designated companies that specify
environmental performance standards beyond
existing regulatory requirements 74 In other
words, the agreement becomes the new set of
environmental standards under which the designated company operates. The company then
is relieved from complying with the law and
need only comply with the terms of the contract.75 These contract terms then become fed-

erally enforceable in lieu of existing legal
requirements of applicable environmental
law.76
The initiative is expressly intended to provide more flexibility for those "good actors"
and environmental leaders that have developed creative, practical ways cf achieving
superior environmental protectibn at their
facilities.77 The participants are selected on the
basis of: "(1) environmental results, (2) cost
savings and paperwork reduction; (3) stakeholder support; (4) innovation/multimedia pollution prevention; (5) transferability; (6) feasibility; (7) monitoring, reporting and evaluation;
and (8) shifting of risk burden."78
With regard to the monitoring, reporting
implemented and twenty-one projects we'e being developed. See XL At a Glance (visited Apr, 13, 1999)
<httpJ/yosemite.epa.gov/xl/xl home nsf/all/xl-glance>
74. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects,
Solicitation of Proposals, 60 Fed Reg, 27282-27291 (May
23, 1995).

75. See id.at 27284.
76 See id,
77. See id.at 27283
78. Id. at 27287.

Spring 1999
and evaluation criterion, program participants
must identify and implement a method for communicating information about the project
(including performance data) to stakeholders in
a form that is easily understood. 79 Projects must
have clear and measurable objectives and
requirements so that EPA and the public can
evaluate the success of the project and enforce
its terms.80 Project XL thus envisions a significant level of environmental auditing which is
evaluated (and made public) as part of a particular "project." The ultimate strategy for the project is embodied in an enforceable document
that contains provisions that allow EPA, the
state, and the community to monitor progress
toward achieving results.
Because Project XL is still in the early
stages, the legal implications are largely
unknown. For example, Project XL should
reduce paperwork burdens for participating
companies, but it is unclear whether there will
be any manner of prosecutorial discretion, or
any immunity for participants. Further, it is still
unknown what response EPA or DOJ will have to
violations of the Project XL "contract" discovered, for example, through an environmental
audit. Presumably DOJ would then bring a
breach of contract action against the participant
based upon the agreement.
B. Common Sense Initiative
Alongside the Clinton Administration's proposals are a number of EPA programs that are
intended to implement the President's proposals, but also represent additional reforms within the existing federal statutory framework,
These programs are all part of EPA's "Common
8
Sense Initiative." '
The Common Sense Initiative takes a multimedia, industry specific consensus approach to
environmental protection and seeks to replace
the traditional pollutant-by-pollutant approach
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. For information on the Common Sense
Initiative, see Common Sense Initiative (visited Apr 13, 199]9
<http-J/www.epa.gov/commonsense/>.
82. The Common Sense Initiative Council is currently testing Common Sense Initiative ideas In at least

ut bias ad O kmries
with a more flexible industry-by-industry
approach,82 The Common Sense Initiative's stated objectives are.
I. Provide incentives for going beyond
compliance
2. Provide incentives for voluntary audits
3. Provide incentives for pollution prevention.
4. Encourage life cycle management
strategies
5, Establish small business assistance
centers.
6. Encourage environmentally responsible
transition for businesses that want to phase
out operations7. Encourage mechanisms to enhance
customer/supplier partnerships8, Consolidate emergency response plans,
9- Establish community information net-

works.
10. Identify performance-based alternatives
to existing permitting approaches
II. Develop and streamline relevant and
accessible reporting and information
access.
12 Develop a simplified and consolidated
reporting format for all programs
13 Encourage electronic reporting
14 Develop more meaningful and accurate
measurements of environmental performance83
The specific actions to implement these
objectives are being developed through a
"multi-stakeholder" consultation process so as
to develop as much up front consensus and
support as possible. Six subcommittees have
been organized around six industrial sectors:
electronics and computers, iron and steel,
petroleum refining, printing, metal finishing,
and automobile manufacturing84
forty projects Sete Common Sene initiati e Progress and

Accomplishments Nvsitei Apr 13, 1999) <http//
wxw epa govqcommransenselacmpltsh html>
83 See Regulatory Remvention iXLi Pdot Projects,
supra note 74 at 27 286 (emphasis added)

84 See Common Sense IntiatLve Approach Ivisited Apr
13.
19991 <http 11Jww epa gov/commonsense!CSI
Approach html>
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Generally, the Common Sense Initiative is
evaluating opportunities for improvement in
the areas of regulation compliance, permitting,
pollution prevention, reporting and environmental technology.8 5 The Common Sense
Initiative uses a consensus approach; each of
the six subcommittees has approximately
twenty-five individuals representing the viewpoints of industry, EPA, the states, environmental justice and labor organizations. 86 Each
of these subcommittees is developing a plan
covering a broad spectrum of activities.87
Importantly, these activities include reporting
requirements and public access to data. 88
C. Environmental Leadership Program
In June, 1994, EPA created the Environmental, Leadership Program (ELP) for so-called
"model" companies. EPA will use ELP to "recognize and reward companies that lead the way
in environmental management."8 9 Two of the
stated benefits to regulated participants are:
(I) an opportunity for facilities to inform and
directly participate in EPA's effort to reassess
its environmental auditing policy; and (2) to
allow industry to participate in discussions of
other policy modifications and incentives that
could help facilities overcorrie barriers to selfmonitoring and compliance efforts.9 0 In order
to participate in the ELP, however, facilities
must have environmental management and
auditing programs and must be willing to disclose
the results of their audits.91
According to EPA, the ELP allows facilities
to identify ways to streamline the reporting
requirements and reduce compliance inspec85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Currently, ten companies and two federal facilities are participating in the ELP pilot program.
Participants include: Ocean State Power, Duke Power,
Gillette Company, John Roberts, Motorola, Ciba Geigy,
Arizona Public Service, Salt River Project, McClellan Air
Force Base, Simpson Tacoma Kraft Company, Puget
Sound Navel Shipyard and WMX Technology. See
"Environmental Leadership Program Company Participation(visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://es.epa.gov/elp/facil.html>.

tions without sacrificing environmental and
public health protection.9 2 Facilities will use
innovative management techniques such as
environmental auditing and pollution prevention to reduce the burden of paperwork and
inspections of facilities, while enhancing compliance with existing environmental laws" 3 In
return for their participation, facilities will
receive public recognition and a limited grace
period in which to correct any violations during
4
the course of the pilot projects.2
With regard to the disclosure of audit
results, EPA indicates that it is interested in
examining how disclosure of audit results
could improve the public's confidence in and
acceptance of industry's sel-monitoring
efforts, and how disclosure could help facilitate the flow of information to the personnel
responsible for implementing audit recommendations. 95 Facilities participating in the
ELP must demonstrate a willingness to disclose, in some manner, the results of their
96
audits.

As with Project XL, the legal implications
of the ELP for participants is somewhat
unclear, particularly regarding how EPA will
respond to future violations voluntarily
revealed and corrected pursuant to the ELP
IV. California EPA Environmental Audit
Policy

On July 8, 1996, the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) released its
latest audit policy known as the "Unified
Cal/EPA Policy on Incentives for Self90.

See EPA Environmental Leader,-hip Program,

Request for Environmental Leadership Program Pilot
Project Proposals, 59 Fed Reg. at 32062-63 (June 21,
1994),
91. See The ELP Framework (visited Apr 13, 1999)
<http://es.epa gov/elp/frmwk htm>
92.

See EPA Environmental Leadership Program,

supra note 90, at 32062.
93.

See id,

94.

See id.

95.

See id. at 32063.

96.

See id.
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Evaluation" (Unified Policy).97 This audit policy

represents a significant change from Cal/EPAs
1993 audit policy, and incorporates most of the
major principles found in the EPA audit policy.98
The stated purpose of the Unified Policy is
to encourage regulated entities to discover,
voluntarily disclose, correct and prevent violations of federal, state and local environmental
requirements.9 The policy is expressly intended to guide settlement in both administrative
and civil judicial enforcement actions.1 00 The
central component of the policy, of course, is
waiver of gravity-based or the punitive portion
of penalties for violations of environmental
requirements where nine stated conditions are
met, and where such violations are discovered
through "due diligence efforts" or an environmental audit.' 0' The policy indicates that such
voluntary efforts play a critical role in protecting human health and' the environment by
identifying, correcting and ultimately, prevent02
ing violations.
Under the Unified Policy, Cal/EPA will
reduce gravity-based penalties for violations of
environmental requirements by 75 percent
where eight of the nine stated conditions are
met, even if violations are not discovered
through an audit or "due diligence" program. 103
In addition, Cal/EPA, at its discretion, may
reduce the gravity-based penalties by up to an
additional 15 percent as a credit for investment
in "pollution prevention" programs. 0 4
Cal/EPA expressly reserves the right to collect any economic benefit that may be earned
as a result of non-compliance, even where
companies meet all other conditions of the
policy, except in instances where Cal/EPA
97. The policy, originally issued as a general policy
in 1996. was reissued as a unified policy in 1998 by

Memorandum from Gerald G.Johnston, Deputy Secretary
for Law Enforcement and Counsel Ihereinafter -Unified

determines that the economic benefit component may be insignificant. 0 Thus, Cal/EPA's
"incentive" for self-evaluation is mere penalty
mitigation, as opposed to immunity, In order
to take advantage of the incentives provided in
the policy, the following nine conditions must
be metL (1) systematic discovery 12) voluntary
discovery; (3) prompt disclosure (i.e., within
ten working days); (4) discovery and disclosure
independent of government or third parties, (5)
correction and remediation "as expeditiously
as possible;" (6) prevention of recurrence, 17)
no repeat violations, (8) no resultant serious or
imminent harm; and (9) cooperation,'%
Cal/EPA will not recommend to the DOI or
other prosecuting authority that criminal
charges be brought against a regulated entity
where it determines that the nine conditions
are satisfied, so long as the violation does not
demonstrate: (1)a prevalent management philosophy or practice that condones environmental violations; or (2) high level corporate
officials' or managers' conscious and knowing
involvement in, or willful blindness to, violations-107 Also, Cal/EPA restates its policy of not
routinely requesting audits to initiate civil or
criminal investigations. 1
The Unified Policy is, in many respects,
similar to the final EPA audit policy, Cal!EPA
expressly attempted to make the new audit
policy consistent with the EPA audit policy,
There are, however, some significant differences between the two audit policies
Perhaps the most striking difference is the
"Cal/EPA fee-for-service audit'ldue diligence
review, which Cal/EPA will perform for regulated entities to help them determine whether
Incentives, supra note 13, at 66705

99

See Unifed Policy, supra note 97 at 5

100

See Id

Policy"I, on December 15, 1998. See Compendium of CaIEPA

101

Sm id at7

Unified Enforcement Policies (visited Apr. 13, 1999)
<http://www.calepa.ca.gov/programslunienforce/

102

See d

cover.htm>. See generally "Ca/EPAReleases Final Audit Policy(visited Apr. 13, 1999) CaIEPA News Release C25-96, July
8, 1996, at <http:/l www.calepa.ca gov/publicationsf
press/1996i25-96.txt>. See also KENNETH A. MANASTER &

103

SeeId at8

104

Seeid at4

105

Seeid at7

DANIEL P. SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND L ,4D

106

See id at 11-18

USE PRACTICE. § 54.12.

107

Seeid at8

108

SeeId at 10

98.

Compare Unified Policy, supra note 97, with
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their due diligence programs or EMSs conform
to the definitions set forth in the Cal/EPA audit
policy. 09 Presumably, the intended advantage
for the regulated entity is that it would know in
advance of discovery of any violations whether
it meets the definitional requirements of the
policy. Cal/EPA, however, has made clear that
this particular portion of the policy is not a
guarantee of immunity' 10 Given this lack of
immunity, it is questionable whether sufficient
incentive exists to compel entities to seek a
due diligence review. Put more frankly, why
would any regulated entity open itself up to
such an intrusive procedure when appropriate
safeguards are not provided-and pay for the
procedure?
In order for a regulated entity to enjoy the
benefits of the Unified Policy, it must disclose
a significant amount of potentially quite sensitive documentation and other information with
regard to environmental violations. For example, condition 3 of the policy requires that the
entity give Cal/EPA prompt notice (within ten
working days) of the violation; the disclosure
must be in writing and generally will be made
publicly available pursuant to the Public Records
Act." ' With regard to correction of violations
(condition 5), where Cal/EPA finds it appropriate, it shall require that the regulated entity
enter into a publicly available written agreement."12 Moreover, with regard to condition 9,
concerning "cooperation," the entity must provide such information as is considered necessary and requested by Cal/EPA to determine
the applicability of the policy"13
The Unified Policy expressly indicates that
it will not seek documents subject to the attorney-client privilege." 4 Under the policy, and as
discussed below, however, a regulated entity
may still be compelled to produce sensitive
documents which may otherwise be protected
by the "critical self-analysis" privilege, or even
the "attorney work product" doctrine.
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V. Securities and Exchange Commission
Regulations on Disclosure of
Environmental Liabilities and NonCompliance
One often overlooked policy relating to
environmental disclosures is the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC or
Commission) policy regarding disclosure of
environmental liabilities. As the SEC steps up
enforcement of these policies, and as companies perform more thorough environmental
self-analysis, particularly pursuant to ISO
14000, closer attention must be paid to 10-K
environmental disclosures and 1heir implications.
Specific SEC environmental disclosure
obligations are contained in regulation S-K,
which sets forth standard disclcsure requirements applicable to the content of the nonfinancial statement portions of filings under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934." 5 Three provisions of
regulation S-K have particular significance for
issuers that are subject to potential environmental liability risks. Regulation S-B," 6 which
applies to small business issuers, incorporates
these three provisions of regulation S-K without substantive change.
Item 101 of regulation S-K requires an
issuer to provide a general description of its
business. It also requires specific disclosure of
the material effects that compliance with federal, state and local environmental laws may
have upon the capital expenditures, earnings,
117
and competitive position of the issuer
Item 103 of regulation S-K requires that the
issuer disclose any material, pending legal proceeding including specified proceedings arising under federal or state environmental
laws. 118 Any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities
must be disclosed." 9 Moreover, the manage-

109.

See id. at 10-11.

115.

See 17CFR §229(1998)

110.

See id. at I.

116.

See 17CFR § 228 (1998),

1i1.

See id. at 13-14.

117.

See 17C.FR §229,101,

112.

See id. at 15.

118.

See 17C.FR § 229.103.

113.

See id. at 18.

119,

See id.

114.

See id.
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ment discussion and analysis provisions of
regulation S-K, item 103. require management
to discuss the issuer's historical results and its
future prospects. 20 Obviously, item 103 would
compel management to disclose the significant implications of environmental laws on
future operations of the issuer.
The SEC staff accounting bulletins (SAB92) under Topic 5. "Miscellaneous accounting
for disclosure of loss contingencies." and Topic
10, "Presentation of liabilities for environmental costs," deal with disclosure of environmental liability costs on company balance
sheets.' 2' Perhaps the most controversial
aspect of these staff accounting bulletins is the
view of the Commission staff that, for the vast
majority of situations, contingent liabilities
should be displayed on the face of the balance
sheet separately from amounts claimed for
recovery from insurance carriers or other third
22
parties.
There have been few administrative proceedings involving the SEC's environmental
disclosure requirements, and enforcement
regarding these requirements has historically
been fairly lax. The question arises for any particular company making such a disclosure
whether internal investigations (e.g., audits)
are needed to assist in making decisions
regarding disclosure of environmental liabilities. Another question is whether the audits
themselves will contribute to developing information which must be revealed pursuant to
SEC regulation. Ifso, protection for such information is a significant concern.
SAB-92 can probably compel disclosure of
environmental information found by an audit
that would otherwise be protected by an audit
privilege or "audit immunity." This is particularly true given that the SEC is apparently
poised to heighten scrutiny of 10-K filings
related to environmental liabilities.

120.

See id.

121.

See 58 Fed. Reg. 32843 (1993).

122. See id. at 32844.

VI. Confidentiality of Environmental Audit
Findings and Recommendations
Although government policy generally
encourages voluntary environmental selfauditing and self-correction, few provisions
provide privileges or immunities protections
for self-auditing entities As a result, perhaps
the most important issue surrounding environmental audits is the extent to which disclosure
of audit findings and conclusions can be compelled or must be disclosed Often this issue
arises out of regulatory agency enforcement
actions The importance of protection from disclosure is heightened in light of EPA and other
programs discussed above As discussed
below, the traditional bases for privilege offer
little comfort that the results of environmental
audits
A. Common Law Privileges
The traditional bases for protection under
common law are the attorney-client privilege,
and the attorney work product doctrine. in
addition, a third privilege, called the 'self-evaluation privilege," has recently developed. As
will be discussed, none of these privileges
meet all of the concerns regarding disclosure
of environmental audits
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is premised
on the social policy of encouraging full, frank
and open discussions bermeen clients and
counsel
The corollary to this premise is that
the right of disclosure and adverse use would
discourage such communications, and thereby
undermine effective advocacy'243 In the environmental regulatory context, the invocation of
the attorney-chent privilege can facilitate society's interest in compliance with applicable
regulator requirements by encouraging rigorous and critical self-evaluation
In order to invoke the privilege, an environmental audit must take place within the scope
123

See UpM, rp Co v Urtit!,J
States 44Q U S 383,

38 9 1Q811

124
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of the attorney-client privilege, under which the
regulated corporation seeks legal advice as the
client of the attorney. 125 Therefore, an audit
must be initiated upon the advice of counsel,
and must be conducted under the supervision
and control of an attorney, as either in-house
26
counsel or outside counsel.
Notably, there is a slight edge given to the
use of outside counsel in invoking the privilege
because of the perception that in-house counsel
may be functioning in the capacity of business
advisor rather than counsel. In United States v.
Chevron, the District Court held that environmental compliance status reports sent to inhouse counsel were not covered by the privilege
because the attorney did not act in the "capacity Iof I an attorney" but rather "as, for example, a
business advisor."127 In order to qualify for the
privilege, the primary purpose for the privilege
128
must be to "gain or provide legal assistance."
In contrast to Chevron, in Olen Properties Corp. v.
Sheldalh, Inc., 129 the District Court prevented discovery of an environmental audit memorandum
(and letters and notes regarding the same) prepared by in-house environmental managers at
the direction of in-house counsel. Although the
brief opinion provides no analysis, the court
indicated that it relied upon the attorney-client
privilege, the "joint defense" privilege,130 and the
attorney work product doctrine in finding the
materials were all privileged.' 31
Once the information is developed and
obtained upon the advice and under the supervision and control of counsel, the privilege, of
course, is not lost by mere disclosure to outside
experts retained to assist counsel in conducting
the audit. In fact, typically the audit is actually
performed by non-attorney, environmental and
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management system consultants. What Is
essential, however, is that such experts act
directly under the direction and ccntrol of coun32
sel.
It bears emphasis that, even though all of
the elements of the privilege are met, factual
information discovered through the audit may
not be protected from disclosure. 3 3 By way of
example, raw environmental analytical data may
not be protected from disclosure, but interpretations, recommendations and conclusions may
be protected.
A further critical element of the privilege
involves waiver by disclosure to third parties.
The privilege is lost to the extent of the disclosure to third parties not within the attorneyclient relationship. 13 4 Therefore, disclosure
must be on a strictly "need to know" basis.
Finally, the communications must not be
made for the purpose of committing a tort or
crime. 135 The purpose must relate to corrective
action and remediation of known or anticipated
problems, and not merely for developing a
shield to prevent disclosure of sensitive, liablity-producing information. While it: can be difficult to discern one precise motivation for conducting an audit, persistent and extensive environmental non-compliance over a protracted
period of time may suggest the lack of a reme-

125. See United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No.
CIVA. 88-6681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. October 16, 1989).

dial motive for the audit, and thus compel dis-

closure. Contrast this limitation with that of the
attorney work product doctrine (discussed
below), which requires that the materials are
prepared in anticipation of litigation.
2. Attorney Work Product Doctrine
The attorney work product doctrine is, in
some respects, broader and, in other respects,

126.

See Casto, supra note 62, at 174.

the lawyer subsequently shares them wit i co-defendants
for purposes of a common defense See Waller v Financial
Corp. of Am., 828 F2d 579, 583 n 7 (9th Cir 1987))
131. See Olen Properties, 1994 U S Dibt LEXIS 7125,

127.

Chevron, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at * 17-18.

at 3-4.

128. Id.
129. No. CV91-6446-WDK (Mex), 1994 U.S. Dist.,
LEXIS 7125 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1994).
130. The joint defense privilege is an extension of
the attorney-client privilege under which communications
by a client to his own lawyer may remain privileged when

132.

See Casto, supra note 62, at 174"

133. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. t83,
395-96 (1981)
134.

See id. at 386

135.

SeeClarkv. United States, 289 U S I, 15 (1933).
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more limited in its protection of information
than the attorney-client privilege. The work
product doctrine covers the thoughts, impressions, opinions, conclusions, legal theories
and beliefs of an attorney, even if not derived
from communications between the client and
the attorney. 36 The "work product" itself is pro37
tected as opposed to the "communications."
For example, witness statements and interview
notes obtained pursuant to an environmental
audit may be protected under the attorney
work product doctrine, even though potentially
not protected by the attorney-client privilege, if
the one interviewed is not the "client."
On the other hand, there are specific limitations on the invocation of the work product
doctrine that narrow, and perhaps even eliminate, its utility relative to the environmental
audit. First, the protection afforded may be disregarded where nondisclosure would create
"undue hardship." 13 8 This would most likely
apply to factual information generated by the
audit, which is also generally not protected by
the attorney-client privilege. "Opinion work
product," which probably Would include the
ultimate findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the auditors, is probably the
only information which might arguably be
given "absolute" attorney work product protection from disclosure if all the other elements of
the doctrine are satisfied. 3 9
Second, the materials must be prepared in
anticipation of litigation1 40 In the environmental regulatory context, this usually means in
anticipation of an enforcement action, a cost
recovery action, or a toxic tort case. For work
product materials to be protected, an enforcement action or some other proceeding need
not have already commenced, but must at
141
least be "fairly foreseeable" and "imminent."'
Therefore, materials generated for mere "litiga136. See FED. R. civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman vTaylor, 329 U.S. 495. 508 (1947).
137.

See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.

138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman,, 329
U.S. at 509-10.
139.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 1I.

140.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

tion avoidance" will not be protected, since virtually any document could be included.
Instead, it must appear that there is some
existing violation of applicable regulatory
requirements, and that enforcement action is
"fairly foreseeable" and "imminent" as a result
42
of such violation'
Ironically, to invoke the work product doctrine, the primary purpose of the audit must be
to aid in the legal defense of the client and not
for some other business objective, such as
ensuring environmental compliance with regulations. 43 This raises a potential conflict
between invocation of the attomey-client privilege and the work product doctrine To invoke
the attorney-client privilege, the purpose of the
audit must be essentially remedial and not for
shielding the corporation from liability, while
in order to avail oneself of the work product
doctrine, the very purpose of the audit must be
to assist in preparing a defense to liability in
an enforcement action or other litigation.
Perhaps the most prudent course of action may
be to cite both objectives Under either theory,
counsel must be the direct supervisor and in
control of the audit 144
Even if all the other elements of the work
product doctrine are satisfied, environmental
audit materials will not be protected if pro14
duced in the "ordinary course of business. '

Thus, once a corporation embarks on a systematic, regular environmental auditing program.
the protection afforded by the doctrine will be
lost. Stated otherwise, the price of being a good
corporate citizen in developing an ongoing
environmental audit program is the loss of that
protection, although it is arguable that the
attorney-client privilege may still apply. The
more routine, regular, systematic, and integrated into the corporate culture the environmental
audit becomes, the less likely it is that there
141

See, Terrell E Hunt & Timothy A Wilkins,

Environmenlal Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HAR .' ENvnL L
REv 365,384 1992)
142

See id

143 See Unted States v Gulf Oil Corp, 760 F2d
292, 296-97 (Temp Emer Ct App 1985)
144

See Casto, supra note 126, at 175

145

See GuOil, 760 F2d 292at 297
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will be protection under either theory. The mere
presence of counsel, whether in-house or outside, will not overcome the presumption that
the environmental audit is as much a management tool as cost accounting or financial auditing, rather than liability avoidance. Contrast
this with EPA's policy on environmental audits,
which, while expressly encouraging this type of
systematic audit, provides no protection from
disclosure for the results of any such audit.
3. Self-Evaluation Privilege
Several courts have recognized a "critical
self-analysis" privilege in an effort to encourage
internal self-criticism. 46 For example, in Bredice
v. Doctors Hospital, 47 a medical malpractice suit,
the plaintiff's motion for discovery of certain
staff meeting notes that might bear on the
issue was denied based on the hospital's assertion that disclosure would chill the internal
self-criticism that would help to improve the
quality of health care. 148 A number of other
courts have either determined that the needs of
the party seeking discovery counter-balance the
benefits of protecting audit information, or
49
have refused to recognize this privilege at all.'

In Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,150 the
court stated the following conditions for application of the self-critical analysis privilege: (1)
the materials must have been prepared pursuant to government requirements; (2) the
materials must be subjective or evaluative; and
(3) the policy interest secured by withholding
the documents clearly outweighs the need of a
party seeking the documents. 51 The privilege
appears, however, to be based solely on the discretionary power of the court to recognize an
"overwhelming public interest," which predom146. See John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative
Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 S. CAL L. REV.
621, 634 (1995); see also Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, HARV L, RF v 1083, 1086 (1983).
147.
148.

50 FR.D 249 (D. DC. 1970).
See id. at 251.

149. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992); see also Artesian Water Supply Co. v. Newcastle
County, No. C.A. 5106, 1981 W.L. 15606, at *3-4 (Del. Ch.
1981).
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inates over the countervailing neEd to conduct
discovery. 52 Some courts have rejected the critical self-evaluation privilege on the grounds
that assertions of privilege resting in vague
"public interest" considerations are invalid as
against specific declarations of policy.'"
In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., "1 4 the
District Court for the Northern District of
Florida upheld the "self-critical analysis privilege" for an environmental audit on public policy grounds. The Reichhold court fo:used on the
importance of permitting regulatEd entities to
candidly assess compliance with regulatory or
legal requirements without generating evidence that could be used against them in future
litigation."55 The court opined that such critical
self-evaluation fosters the compelling public
interest in compliance with regulatory requirements. 15 6 Candid self-evaluation is critical to
remediating or improving adverse environmental conditions or violations because:
The privilege protects an organization
or individual from the Hobson s Choice
of aggressively investigating accidents
or possible regulatory violations, ascertaining the cause and results, and correcting any violations or dangerous
conditions, but thereby creating a selfincriminating record that may be evidence of liability, or deliberately avoiding making a record on the subject (and
possibly leaving the public exposed to
danger) in order to lessen the risk of
civil liability.157
The Reichhold court analogized this privilege
to the exclusion of so-called remedial measures
150. Webb v.Westinghouse Elec Corp., 81 FR.D.
431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
151.

Seeid.at434.

152.

See id at433.

153, See, e g, United States v. Dexter Corp,
FRD. 8,9-10 (D. Conn. 1990)
154.

157 FRD. 522 (N.D,Fla 1994)

155.

Id. at 524.

156. See id.
157.

Id.
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embodied in Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.)58 The court also relied upon the 1968
Fifth Circuit decision in Southern Railway Co. v.
Lanham,"59 which held that retrospective investigations of railway accidents are immune from discovery on the public policy grounds of encouraging accident investigations to prevent further
accidents.
Finally, the Reichhold court adopted the following criteria from the Ninth Circuit case of Dowling
v. American Hawaii Cruise, Inc.,' 60 in applying the
privilege:
1. the information must result from critical
self-analysis;
2. the public must have a strong interest in
preserving the free flow of the type of information sought;
3. the information must be of a.type whose
flow would be curtailed if discovery were
allowed; and
4. the document must have been prepared
with the expectation that it would be kept
confidential, and it has, in fact, been kept
confidential.'

61

It bears particular emphasis that the privilege recognized in Reichhold is a qualified privilege and can
be abrogated if the party requesting discovery can
demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" or
"special need." It is possible that a regulatory
body's interest in reviewing the results of environmental audits for determining on-going compliance would constitute such special need.
A number of states have reacted to the inadequacies of these traditional privileges by enacting legislation that extends self-evaluation type
privileges to information contained in voluntarily
prepared environmental audit reports.

158. Id.
159.

403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir 1968).

160.

971 F.2d 423. 426 (9th Cir 1992).

161. See Reichhold Chem.. Inc. v. Textron. Inc. 157
F.R.D. at 526-527. Note that the Ninth Circuit in Dowling

did not expressly adopt a self-critical analysis privilege,
See Dowling, 971 F2d at 426.
162.

See Appendix A regarding state environmental

B. State Statutory Privileges and
Immunities
In response to the concerns regarding protection for environmental audits, at least
twenty-two states have enacted, and several
other states have considered, laws which
specifically provide varying degrees of protection for environmental compliance audit
results and/or immunities from civil and criminal action 162 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois. Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia and Wyoming have all enacted laws
which grant some degree of protection for
environmental compliance audits,
As an example, Oregon's law (the first such
legislation) provides a qualified privilege for
environmental audit reports, but compels
companies to correct the problems discovered
during such environmental audits by requiring
response or remediation for the privilege to
attach. 163 Importantly, the Oregon law gives a
company the opportunity to rectify environmental concerns discovered during an audit
without fear that its audit reports will be used
against it in state civil or criminal actions. 164
At the same time, the Oregon law does not
allow the privilege to attach if the environmental audit reveals that the operation is not
in compliance with an environmental requirement and the company did not reasonably act
6
to correct the discovered problem, 5
Another example is New Hampshire's law
which provides immunity from any penalties
for violating environmental laws as long as the
entity reports the violation promptly (within
thirty days) of discovery, initiates corrective
and remedial actions, and satisfies other
audit privilege laws, see also lohn-Mark Stensvaag The Fine
Print of State EnvironmentalAudit Pnvieges, 16 UCLA I Epir.L
L & Paiy 69, 77-80 11997/1998), Mia Anna Mazza,
Comment, The Neu, Evidentwry Privilegefor Environmental Audit
Reports Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 Ec<DLoGy L_
79, 82 (1996)
163 Or Rev Stat § 36-468 963 19931
164 See id
165 See id

W6it
M.Casto &"iffanyBillinsley Potter

Kelih M.Costa &liffony BiIlin~isIey Potter

statutory criteria. 166 As discussed previously,
EPA has generally frowned on these types of
state protections because they tend to be
inconsistent with EPA's policy of "voluntary
auditing" that is disclosed to the public.
VII.Conclusion and Recommendation
Protections regarding the results of voluntary environmental audits continue to be vitally important to regulated entities. Such protections become critical in light of the ISO 14000
Standards and other factors which contemplate
broad-based, routine and voluntary environmental auditing as part of a company's EMS.
Performing such voluntary audits should not
increase the risk of enforcement or liability for
regulated entities-this would be a clear disincentive to useful and valuable self-evaluation.
EPA's audit policy statements encourage
voluntary environmental auditing, yet offer little in the way of real protections for those entities that undertake such voluntary audits.
EPA's policy focuses chiefly on penalty reduction and criminal enforcement leniency as
"incentives," rather than positive inducements,
such as limited immunity.
In recognition of the concerns over protection for audit results, a number of states have
enacted legislation providing privileges for certain voluntary environmental audits and "limited immunity stemming from the results of
such audits. The primary stated purpose for
privileges and immunities, in all of these laws
is the encouragement of voluntary environmental
audits.
Yet, even the privileges provided in states
with audit protection laws can be easily vitiated. Also, the common law privileges offer little
in the way of protection for environmental
audit results. Although the privilege for the
audit results may provide some limited protection for those entities that "come clean" with
regard to environmental compliance, the privilege itself offers little in the way of real and
positive incentive to perform voluntary environmental audits as part of a larger EMS.
166. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-:E: secs. 1-9 (Michie
Supp. 1998).
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Moreover, the EPA's audit policy specifically
states opposition to state privilege provisions
and reserves EPA's right to enforce violations of
67
federal environmental law.'
This makes the case for proviaing a uniform,
concrete inducement for entities to establish an
EMS all the more compelling. This inducement
must offer a real reward for "environmental
good citizens" who employ ervironmental
management standards, including self-auditing and self-correction.
Clearly, there are legitimate concerns over
granting blanket immunity to enities, which,
through their audits, reveal seriois violations
of environmental laws and regulations.
Particularly for an entity willing to strive for
employing a comprehensive EMS, however,
some level of immunity relative to audit
results, particularly when discovered violations
are self-corrected, presents little risk of undeterred/unpunished environmental non-compliance.
The authors recommend that EPA, in conjunction with the states, execute a concrete,
enforceable EMS Implementation Program.
The EMS Implementation Program should be
divided into two phases. In Phase 1, EPA
should provide regulated entities with the
option of entering into a contract: that would
provide for reduced penalties in exchange for
the implementation of a comprehensive EMS,
Phase I should be offered only for a limited
period of time, e.g., two years, during which
time regulated entities could implement an
EMS, report and correct any violations, and, in
exchange, pay a reduced penalty which is limited by an overall cap. In additior, we recommend that this phase also include a temporary
immunity to both corporations and individuals
(e.g., corporate officers and directors), for the
imposition of criminal penalties and incarceration, except in those cases where willful intent
to violate a law or regulation is proven.
Phase II should be an open-ended offer to
contract with EPA for reduced penalties and
limited immunity when a violation is discovered pursuant to an environmental audit or
167. See Incentives, supra note 13, at 66712

Spdng 1999
Sixini 1999

due diligence program, regardless of whether
the audit was part of a larger EMS. While the
offer to contract should be open-ended, the
contract period should be limited to a sixty or
ninety day period, during which time the regulated entity would be required to disclose and
correct any discovery of a violation. The terms
of such a contract could be consistent with
EPA's Audit Policy, but would have the advantage of being enforceable.
The EMS Implementation Program could
be designed similar to the EPA's Compliance
Audit Program Initiative under section 8(e) of
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),'68
referred to as the "TSCA CAR" The TSCA CAP
was implemented to encourage companies to
comply with TSCA section 8(e), which requires
chemical manufacturers to report information
relating to substances that present a risk to the
environment. 169 Companies were given the
option to enter into a contractual relationship
with EPA that called for reduced penalties and
a penalty cap in exchange for the implementation of a compliance audit program to identify
information required to be reported under
70
TSCA section 8(e).1
The TSCA CAP proved highly successful.
One hundred and twenty-three companies participated in the program and thirty-four reported no violations.' 71 The remaining eighty-nine
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1998).
169. See U.S. EPA, Audit Policy Update. vol. 3. no. I.
(Mar. 1998) (visited Apr. 13. 1999) <http-/es.epa gov/
oeca/audtpol.html>.
170. See Registration and Agreement for TSCA
Section 8(e) Compliance Audit Program. 56 Fed Reg 4128
(1991). Note also, EPA recently announced a similar compliance audit program for the pork industry See
Registration and Agreement for Clean Water Act Section
301 Compliance Audit Program for the Pork Production
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 69672 (1998).
171. See Audit Policy Update, supra note 169.
172. See id.
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companies disclosed 11,000 studies to EPA
which were previously withheld in potential
violation of TSCA 172 These 11.000 studies outnumber the studies submitted to EPA since
1978
Although the TSCA CAP was applicable to
only a small portion of the regulated industry,
the EMS Implementation Program should
include the entire regulated industry. In addition, it should cover violations of any and all
environmental laws and regulations
While this proposal may seem radical, we
believe that a radical solution is needed to
remedy the consequences of a command and
control environment An EMS Implementation
Program would provide regulated entities with
the opportunity to implement a comprehensive EMS without fear of excessive civil and
criminal penalties Moreover, the two year period would provide regulated entities with an
opportunity to correct any major violations
that are discovered which often take longer
than sixty or ninety days to correct
Once an EMS is implemented, the regulated entity, in most cases, should be able to
detect and prevent future violations of laws
and regulations In those situations, however,
where an EMS cannot prevent a violation, routine auditing should result in the quick discovery and correction of future problems
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